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COMMENTS
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD:
BOON OR BABY-SELLING
THE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Most children have one parental set;I an adopted child has
two subsets (one is biological and the other is adoptive); but
the child born from a surrogate arrangement has the unique
possibility of having anywhere from two to five "parents." 2
When the surrogate mother is also the egg donor the term
"surrogate" becomes a euphemism. We are really dealing
with a natural or biological mother who has agreed to con-
ceive, carry a fetus to term, deliver the child and then termi-
nate her parental rights in exchange for medical expenses and
in most cases a sum of money, paid upon fulfillment of the
contract. In short, she sells her child.3
Articles talk of the married infertile couple devastated by
their inability to have a child.4 Little mention is made of the
1. The common parental set is a biological mother and father. This comment will
not deal with stepparents nor an adoptive parent who adopts a child after either the
death or divorce of a natural parent.
2. The combinations are as follows:
2 parents: Egg donor and birth mother are the same and a non-married biologi-
cal father; 3 parents: Egg donor and birth mother are the same, biological fa-
ther and biological father's wife; 4 parents: Egg donor, birth mother, biological
father and biological father's wife; or 5 parents: Egg donor, sperm donor, birth
mother, adoptive father and adoptive mother.
This comment will focus on the surrogate arrangement in which the woman who
carries the fetus to term also donates her gamete (egg).
3. It is the presentation of the child which fulfills the contract.
4. See generally N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 12 (1981);
Comment, Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate Mother's Right to "Rent Her Womb"
for a Fee, 18 GONZ. L. REV. 539, 540-41 (1982-83); No Other Hope for Having a Child,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 50-51; Brochure, Surrogate Parenting: An Alternative
Method of Child Bearing (Center for Surrogate Parenting, Inc., Beverly Hills, Calif.
1986). "Surrogate parenting is an alternative method of child bearing for an infertile
couple when the wife is unable to bear a child." Id.
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single person,5 the homosexual,6 the transsexual,' or the per-
son who feels she is too busy to take the time out to have a
child in the normal way.' Surrogate parenting institutions
and individual attorneys are emerging nationwide, selling the
picture of a family and white picket fence that often belies the
truth of what is involved. 9 Using the argument that there are
not enough babies available, they attempt to circumvent the
statutory prohibition on child selling.' °
This Comment will analyze the question of surrogacy in
light of the constitutional rights of privacy and equal protec-
tion. Does the right to privacy protect the process and is
equal protection an actual factor in the overall surrogate pic-
ture? It will examine the compelling state interest in the sur-
rogate problem and look at how different courts have
addressed the issue of compensation for the surrogate mother.
Finally, this Comment will examine the Wisconsin statutes
pertaining to adoption and artificial insemination and discuss
5. Peterson, Surrogates, Finding No Laws, Often Improvise Birth Pacts, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
6. Id. (When the lesbian couple split, all parties involved - the two lesbian lovers
and the gay father - who provided the sperm - were all granted visitation rights).
7. N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 4, at 150.
8. The use of a surrogate enables the couple to have the husband's biological child
without interrupting the wife's career. Comment, Parenthood by Proxy: Legal Inplica-
tions of Surrogate Birth, 67 IOWA L. REV. 385, 387-88 (1982). With the advancement
in medical technology today, the child could be the biological offspring of both parents
- by the use of in vitro fertilization, the fertilized egg is then implanted into a host
uterus. Handel, Surrogate Parenting, In Vitro Insemination and Embryo Transplanta-
tion, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 783, 784 (1984).
9. Surrogate programs and attorneys handling surrogate arrangements include:
Attorneys Noel Keane (who will handle a surrogate arrangement for anyone); William
Handel (he only accepts infertile couples); Katie Brophy (initially started with a Ken-
tucky surrogate program and then left to start her own); and Burton Stazberg (Philadel-
phia). The centers include Surrogate Parenting, Inc. (California), Surrogate Family
Services, Inc. (Kentucky), Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. (Kentucky), National
Center for Surrogate Parenting (Maryland), Miracle Program and Surrogate Mother-
ing, Ltd. (Pennsylvania).
10. The argument is that legalized abortion and changing attitudes towards the
unwed mother have reduced the number of "perfect" white babies available for adop-
tion. See generally Comment, supra note 8, at 387. But see Galen, Baby Brokers, How
Far Can a Lawyer Go, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 1. According to adoption
attorney L.S. Rosenstock, -[t]here's really a very large underground of people looking
to adopt boys and girls who are looking to give their babies up for adoption. The em-
phasis on tight supply and big demand - it isn't true." Id. Attorney Rosenstock also
claims that she can find a baby for every couple who comes to her and that it often takes
less than nine months to do so. Id.
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how they affect the ability to have a surrogate arrangement in
Wisconsin.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Right of Privacy
Proponents of surrogate motherhood argue, incorrectly,
that the contract, payment of fees, and in fact, the entire
transaction is protected by the Constitution under the aus-
pices of the right of privacy. The constitutionally recognized
right to privacy is relatively new in our history:
When the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ratified,
neither statutes nor common law rules established a right of
privacy as such. And certainly there was no constitutional
provision which clearly provided a vehicle for its inclusion.
The common law with regard to trespass, assault, slander
and libel, and nuisance (as applied to offensive noises and
odors, for example) could be said to have tangential refer-
ence to privacy, but this would offer a piecemeal approach
rather than an argument based on a full-fledged right of
privacy. 1
Privacy is not one of the enumerated constitutional rights.
It is an implied right, but it is not an absolute right. There are
those who would argue that the right is not even a fundamen-
tal one. 12 By tracing the development of the right to privacy
one can show that privacy does not shelter the surrogate
arrangement.
In 1890, the Harvard Law Review published an article by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis referring to the tort
of invasion of privacy. 3 This is later referred to as the begin-
ning of the right to privacy by Roscoe Pound, Dean of the
Harvard Law School. 14
11. M. G. ABERNATHY, CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 578 (4th
ed. 1985).
12. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-12 (1965) (Black, J.. dissenting).
13. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Although the primary concern of the article is protection of the individual from slander,
"[o]ut of a few fragments of the common law, the authors invented a brand new tort,
the invasion of privacy.'" M. G. ABERNATHY, supra note 11. at 578.
14. M. G. ABERNATHY, supra note 11, at 578. "The article did nothing less than
to add a chapter to the law." Id. Over the next sixty-five years, gradually a law of
privacy evolved, using both common law and statutes. Id.
1987]
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One of the earliest cases to mention a right of privacy is
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford,'5 in which the Court
discusses the importance of autonomy over one's own body -
specifically that the government should not be allowed to
force an inspection of one's person in a civil suit.'
6
Development of the right to privacy in matters pertaining
to reproduction and sexual functions is often said to start with
Skinner v. Oklahoma. 7 However, this is a misreading of the
case. The Court does state that "procreation [is] fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race. The power to
sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and devas-
tating effects."' 8 However, this opinion must be viewed in
light of the issues presented by both the case and the times.
Skinner is a 1942 decision, reached during a war period when
the foreseen need was to increase our population. 9 When the
Court speaks of the basic right "to have offspring"" ° what is
meant is the biological ability to reproduce; but the actual
right of reproduction is not protected. 21 That the right (to be
able to reproduce) is not absolute is evidenced by the fact that
the Skinner Court22 does not overrule Buck v. Bell.23  The
Buck Court concludes that state-authorized sterilization of
mental patients is not unconstitutional,24 and does not violate
the individual's constitutional rights under the fourteenth
15. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
16. Id. But see DISCOVERY, 35 F.R.D. 39, 85-87 (1963) (modern application of
FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (allowing physical and mental examination of persons when motion
is made upon good cause)); Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26 F.R.D. 595 (1960)
(Rule 35 supplants earlier holdings about medical examinations).
17. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
18. Id. at 541.
19. Today, when overpopulation of the planet is a threat, an opposite position
might be taken by the Court. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). "[A] state may
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth. Such con-
cerns are basic to the future of the State and in some circumstances could constitute a
substantial reason for departure from a position of neutrality between abortion and
childbirth." Id. at 478 n.ll.
20. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
21. Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy, and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REV.
263, 281 (1984).
22. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 542.
23. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
24. Id. at 207.
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amendment's due process and equal protection clauses.25
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes states:
The attack is not upon the procedure but upon the substan-
tive law. It seems to be contended that in no circumstances
could such an order be justified.... We have seen more than
once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens
for their lives .... The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian
tubes.26
In Skinner, the Court further states that Oklahoma's
mandatory sterilization law for repeat criminal offenders is
unconstitutional because under the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause there is invidious discrimination in the
way in which the statute was applied. "When the law lays an
unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the
same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it
has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a
particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment. '27
In Griswold v. Connecticut2 8 the right of privacy within the
confines of the marital relationship is recognized. Here Jus-
tice Douglas speaks of the
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by sev-
eral fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns
a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather
than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve
its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact
upon that relationship .... The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.29
What we are dealing with in this instance is the marital unit
- the relationship between a husband and wife - who are
viewed as a single fictitious unit. The freedom involved is the
right to enjoy a sexual relationship, sanctioned by the state,
and the right to choose not to bear a child as a result of that
sexual union. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Gris-
wold also refers to the notion of protecting the privacy of the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 541.
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. Id. at 485-86 (emphasis in original).
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
family unit and of the right to marry and have children. 30 He
states:
Of this whole "private realm of family life" it is difficult to
imagine what is more private or more intimate than a hus-
band and wife's marital relations.
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes
that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that
the rights to marital privacy ...are of similar order and
magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected.3
"Although both Skinner and Griswold afford constitu-
tional protection to the private decision of whether or not to
bear children, the freedom they promote is not freedom for
individuals, but freedom only for families. ' 32 A family in this
instance is the husband and wife. Basic to these decisions is
the right to use contraception - the right to remain childless.
After Griswold the next logical step for the Supreme Court
was the extension of the right to use contraception to unmar-
ried individuals. This is accomplished in the Court's decision
in Eisenstadt v. Baird.33 The right to have a sexual relation-
ship without the fear of pregnancy is extended to the individ-
ual - not just the couple. The Court states "if the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental in-
trusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."' 34 Again the Court
is striking down a statute prohibiting the use of contraception
and reaffirming that an individual has the right to choose not
to have children.
Control over one's body, a concept that was evidenced
even in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford,35 becomes para-
mount in the landmark case Roe v. Wade.36 Citing to Union
Pacific, Justice Blackmun writing for the court states: "The
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.
30. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
31. Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
32. Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of Choice. 22 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 291, 310 (1982).
33. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
34. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
35. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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In a line of decisions, . . . the Court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy, or guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. ' 37 The
Court continues that within this right to privacy is the right
for a woman and her physician to choose to terminate a preg-
nancy.38 Again the Court is dealing with the right not to have
a child. The decision clearly states that the right to an abor-
tion is not absolute: "The privacy right involved, therefore,
cannot be said to be absolute. ' 39 The Court reiterates that the
right of privacy does not extend to an "unlimited right to do
with one's body as one pleases."4
The relationship between the marital unit and pregnancy
or procreation involves different levels of protection and not
all of these are entitled to privacy. The Court clearly states its
position when it writes:
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She
carries an embryo and, later, a fetus. . . . The situation
therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or
bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or
procreation, or education.... The woman's privacy is no
longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be
measured accordingly. 41
In Carey v. Population Services International42 the Court
addresses the right of privacy as it applies to non-prescription
contraception and minors. Again we are dealing with the
choice of remaining childless, and additionally with the rising
number of teenage pregnancies. Perhaps in an attempt to
stem the tide, the Court held that the New York statute was in
violation of the first amendment and that the ban was not rele-
vant to a state's interest in teenage promiscuity.43
37. Id. at 152.
38. Id. at 153.
39. Id. at 154. Rights which are identified as being fundamental are not absolute
and may be subject to state regulation when the state presents a compelling state inter-
est. Id. at 155. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state has the
right to order vaccination).
40. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 159.
42. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
43. Id. at 697-99. The Court notes that under New York law a girl of 14, with
parental and court consent, could marry but would be prohibited from using birth con-
trol. Id. at 695 n.18 (again the Court is implying that the right upon which the New
York statute infringed was the right to choose not to have a child).
1987]
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Finally in Bowers v. Hardwick 4 4 the Supreme Court ex-
pressly states that not all actions in the bedroom are protected
from intrusion by the state. Writing for the majority, Justice
White states that the notion that the right of privacy protects
any sexual act between two consenting adults as being
"constitutionally insulated from state proscription is un-
supportable."4 5 Additionally, the Court notes that there is no
textual support in the language of the Constitution for the pri-
vacy cases.46
In the surrogate situation the introduction of the third in-
dividual (who is not a family member) immediately takes the
action outside of the protected "zone."47 To complicate mat-
ters, the surrogate is often encumbered with a husband and
children of her own.48 With this enlarged cluster of individu-
als comes an even stronger reason for state intervention. At
present there are no comprehensive studies available to assess
the effects that a surrogate arrangement has on either the
child born to a surrogate, her other children, or the woman
herself.4 9 It is imperative to ask what trauma exists in watch-
ing the growth of a brother or sister and then seeing the child
sold.5 0
44. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
45. Id. at 2844.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
48. The surrogate is usually a woman who has already had a child. There are two
reasons for this: First, having a child is considered proof of her fertility; second, by
having had a child it is thought that it will be easier for her to give up the new baby
because the surrogate has firsthand knowledge of what a child brings to a family. See,
e.g., Handel, supra note 8, at 785; Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child,
20 J. FAM. L. 263, 265 (1981-82).
49. One child psychiatrist at Harvard Medical School recently stated that: "A
child conceived and born for the purpose of providing a baby for the father would view
itself as 'property.' . . . That child ... would perceive itself as 'different from the vast
majority of humanity.'" Hanley, Baby M Witness Cites Risks to Child Taken fiom
Mother, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at 22, col. 5 (citations omitted).
50. Donna Regan, at age 23, has had four children, three of whom were sold to
individuals who contracted for them. Ms. Regan's first child now has behavioral
problems and is under a psychologist's care, but Ms. Regan sees no correlation between
the child's problems and her having been a surrogate mother. Peterson, Baby M Case
Stirs Feelings of Surrogate Mothers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1987, at 14, col. 1. Elizabeth
Kane's (pseudonym) daughter (age 17) was 11 when Ms. Kane was a surrogate mother.
Ms. Kane states: "'She is still having problems with what I did, and as a result she is
still angry with me.' " Id. Does the child of a surrogate mother wonder - If I'm bad
will I be sold, too? Does the child wonder what he/she is worth? The husband of Mary
[Vol. 71:115
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B. Equal Protection
Another line of defense argued by those in favor of surro-
gate motherhood is that the procedure is constitutionally pro-
tected under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause.5 ' To be within the scope of the equal protection clause
a right must be deemed fundamental, 51 be "explicitly or im-
plicitly guaranteed by the Constitution"5 3 and involve a sus-
pect class.54 It should be noted that the Court has not
accepted gender as a suspect classification, 55 although most
decisions dealing with regulations relating to discrimination
against women have been held to be in violation of the equal
protection clause because they were not substantially related
to important government objectives. 6
What is at issue is the attempt to equate semen donation
with the right to use a surrogate mother. The two major argu-
ments are as follows: Most states allow a man to sell his
sperm and "surrogate fatherhood" by artificial insemination
by donor (AID) is allowed in all states. 7 Sperm banks have
governmental sanction. Therefore, since a man can sell his
bodily fluids, a woman should be able to sell her body for re-
productive purposes.58
The second argument is that surrogacy is the counterpart
of artificial insemination. If a man is infertile and his wife is
fertile, the wife can be artificially inseminated with the sperm
of usually an anonymous donor to produce a child. There-
fore, it is argued, when the man is fertile and the woman infer-
tile, the man should be able to use his sperm to impregnate
another woman, who is usually not anonymous, to bear his
child.
Beth Whitehead (surrogate for Baby M) has stated that he was troubled by "the
thought of taking $10,000 for Ryan [their son] and Tuesday [their daughter] by selling
their sister." Who Keeps 'Baby M, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 49.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
53. Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted).
54. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
55. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
56. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1977).
57. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. i.. U.L.J. 147, 153.
58. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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The fallacy in the first argument is that the man sells se-
men while a woman sells far more than just some reproductive
cells in fluid. If there is any equation to be drawn, it is that if
a man can sell his sperm, then a woman, equivalently, should
be able to sell her eggs, thereby entitling her to equal protec-
tion under the fourteenth amendment. Unfortunately, while
the production of sperm can be done in private and has the
potential of being an enjoyable experience for the male, eggs
can only be harvested by either surgical or intrusive interven-
tion,59 and therefore the process carries with it the inherent
pain and dangers of any invasive procedure.
The rebuttal to the second argument is that when the wife
is fertile and undergoes AID we are assured of several crucial
factors - namely, that the husband cannot father the child,
the couple is married,6" and that this is not being used as a
way to have a child without the inconvenience of a preg-
nancy.61 A positive aspect of AID is the fact that the father
can begin the bonding process with the baby while the preg-
nancy progresses. 62  From the outset the family unit forms
and grows naturally. Except in the rarest of instances, with
surrogate procedures the fetus grows into a baby and bonds
only with the surrogate (natural) mother and those with
whom she interacts. If she is married and has children then
59. There are two methods for the removal of eggs from the female. The most
common method employs laparoscopy. This involves a hospital procedure performed
under general anesthesia and requires a minimum of two incisions in the abdomen.
Methods for Removing Eggs, 1 Women's Self Health 2 (Winter 1987) (newsletter from
Good Samaritan Medical Center, Milw. Wis.). A newer, non-surgical, office procedure
uses ultrasound "to locate the ova, which, instead of being collected through a surgical
incision, are obtained by catheter through the uterus." In Vitro Fertilization Procedure
Leads to Birth of Quadruplets, Am. Med. News, Feb. 20, 1987, at 30, col. I.
60. This Comment is not addressing the issue of whether a single woman has the
right to artificial insemination. For suggested reading on this subject, see Kritchevsky,
The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Defi-
nition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1981). But see Smith & Iraola, Comment.
supra note 21.
61. See Comment, supra note 8, at 387-88; Note, Surrogate Mothers, The Legal
Issues, 7 AM. 1. LAW & MED. 323, 324 (1981).
62. For the psychological bonding of the father to the baby see A. COIMAN & L.
COLMAN, PREGNANCY, THE PSYCHOLOGICAl. EXPERIENCE 97, 124-28 (1971). In
most surrogate situations, neither the biological father nor his wife bond with the baby
during the prenatal period. The adjustment for the adoptive mother, who also has the
prime responsibility for child care, may be difficult or even insurmountable. L. AN-
DREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS 199-201 (1984); see also N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note
4, at 243 (problems of fathers whose wives have been artificially inseminated).
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her family bonds with the baby. Furthermore, even the most
ardent proponents of surrogacy admit that while there is no
physical danger to the sperm donor and the time spent is only
momentary, the surrogate mother does undergo physical dan-
ger and discomfort.63 The duration of an average of thirty-
eight to forty weeks of time are invested in the project.64 This
is full time work - twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week - without any time off: "Pregnancy and childbirth are
hazardous, time-consuming, painful conditions. ' 65 Equal pro-
tection can only attach when equal rights are at stake. Here
we have non-equivalent biological functions, but equal protec-
tion to donate the gamete cells exists (nothing stops a woman
from donating eggs).
The Supreme Court holds that the equal protection clause
of the Constitution requires that a classification "must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike."' 66 The Court allows the states broad
power in creating their classifications and applies a rational
basis test to determine if there has been invidious discrimi-
nation against a class. 67 These requirements have been reiter-
ated in Eisenstadt v. Baird.68 The Constitution does not
guarantee the right to be a parent. The ability to be a parent is
biological. Under these guidelines, until that time when a
man can carry a baby to term, the roles of men and women in
creating a child are too different to equate sperm donation
with surrogate motherhood. It should, therefore, be obvious
that the statement "[mien and women who use their repro-
ductive organs to provide services for infertile couples are sim-
ilarly situated but not treated alike' 69 is inaccurate.7 °
63. Keane, supra note 57, at 153.
64. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 246
(17th ed. 1985) (normal duration of a pregnancy).
65. Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEW ENG. L. REv. 373,
380 (1981); See also R. BOLOGNESE, R. SCHWARZ & J. SCHNEIDER, PERINATAL
MEDICINE (2d ed. 1982) (dangers associated with pregnancy).
66. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
67. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
68. 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972).
69. Comment, supra note 4, at 558 (emphasis added).
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in favor of payment to surrogates is that since the contract is
entered into prior to conception there is no coercion and
therefore the baby-selling statutes are not violated. How
many women will enter into surrogacy simply to feed their
children, repair a roof, or buy a new car? Not all women who
relinquish parental rights are poor or unmarried. 2 There are
numerous reasons for a woman choosing to place a child up
for adoption. Regardless of the reasons involved, the baby-
selling statutes are still applicable to these cases and therefore
should also be applicable to the surrogate situation.8 3
Another attempt to distinguish surrogacy from baby-sell-
ing is that the child is being turned over to its natural father.8 4
Neither the courts nor the legislatures should accept this argu-
ment. Just because the child is going to its natural father does
not guarantee that the child will have a "good home."'8 5 De-
sire or biological ability to be a parent does not equate with
parenting skills. Any child that is subject to the termination
of parental rights deserves the protection of the state, and a
full investigation into where the child is placed should be
mandatory.
It is also important that the state protect the vulnerable
woman from misuse by commercial surrogate parenting
to legislate against child selling failed on the federal level but since then, all states have
enacted statutes making the selling of a child a crime. Id.
Most states permit the adopting couple to pay medical costs while others allow
"maintenance expenses during the latter part of the pregnancy." Landes & Posner, The
Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 328 (1978). The statutes are
designed to prevent the sale of children and the coercion of a natural mother to place a
child for adoption. See Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction
Technologies, 70 A.B.A. J. 50 (Aug. 1984).
82. Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It?, 10 AM. J. LAW & MED. 243,
250 (1984-85).
83. The surrogate situation is not free from all elements of coercion and therefore
should fall under the baby-selling statutes. Id. at 250-51.
84. There may be a question as to who is the natural father. L. SPEROFF, R.
GLASS, & N. KASE, CLINICAL GYNECOLOGIC ENDOCRINOLOGY & INFERTILITY 518
(3d ed. 1983). "A number of studies of selected [AID] newborn populations have indi-
cated that over 10% of the infants could not be the offspring of the putative fathers on
the basis of blood typing." Id.
85. "Studies show child abuse and neglect to transcend all socio-economic groups."
CHILD ABUSE, INTERVENTION & TREATMENT xiii (N. Ebelery & D. Hill eds. 1975).
Another study has shown that when adoption is used in an attempt to solve other mari-
tal problems, a higher rate of child abuse/neglect may actually result. THE BATI-r:RED
CHIL.D 70 (C. Kempe & R. Heifer 3d ed. 1980).
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organizations. Indeed, reports of many of the women who
have become surrogate mothers show them to be alcoholics,
drug addicts, former abused children, and social outcasts. 6
One surrogate, Elizabeth Kane (a pseudonym) has now come
forward to express her deep regret at ever having given up her
child. 87  Ms. Kane now sees the surrogate process as only
"transferring the pain from one woman to another, from a
woman who is in pain from her infertility to a woman who has
to give up her baby." '88 Additionally, these organizations
often state that their purpose is to provide a "valuable medical
service. '"" But it must be noted that the service is for the pay-
ing parties (the biological husband and his wife) and not for
the potential surrogate mother, to whom they must then give
a fee.90 If nothing else, this at least should alert the state to a
possible conflict of interest.
IV. THE COURTS
Two crucial questions are currently facing both the courts
and the state legislatures. The first question concerns the sur-
rogate contract. Is the contract void, and if not, is it enforcea-
ble or voidable? If voidable, at what point is it enforceable?
The second question is usually dependent upon the first being
resolved in favor of the existence of the contract. If the con-
tract is valid, then one asks: May the surrogate mother be
compensated for more than just routine medical expenses?9"
A. Foreign
Victoria, Australia, by legislation, prohibits the use of
commercial surrogate parenting. 92 Great Britain, on the other
hand, like the United States, has no legislation concerning the
86. N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 4, at 60-63, 106-07.
87. The Baby "M" case in New Jersey prompted Ms. Kane to come forward and
recant her earlier statements of how wonderful it was to be a surrogate mother. Mitch-
ard, The Surrogate Question, Milw. J., Jan. 25, 1987, § G (Life/Style) at 1, col. 3.
88. Who Keeps 'Baby M, supra note 50, at 46.
89. Recent Developments, An Incomplete Picture: The Debate About Surrogate
Motherhood, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 231, 237 (1985).
90. Id.
91. For an interesting discussion of the surrogate contract and whether the right to
abort the fetus is an alienable right, see Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inaliena-
ble Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (1986).
92. Human Reproduction & L. Rep. (Legal-Medical Studies) 14 (Jan.- Feb. 1986).
[Vol. 71:115
SURROGA TE MOTHERHOOD
surrogate process. England first addressed the problem of sur-
rogacy in 1978. 93 The case involved a man (a professional)
who paid a woman three thousand pounds to have a child for
him through artificial insemination. After the baby was born
the child was to be turned over to the man to be raised by him
and his fiancee. The mother refused to give up the child and
the father sued. The British Family Court held that the
mother would receive custody and the natural father would
have visitation rights.94 A note to the case states that the
mother appealed the visitation rights and a three judge panel
terminated visitation for the natural father.95
B. Domestic
As of this writing, no legislation regulating surrogate
motherhood exists in the United States. Attempts have been
made to apply the termination of parental rights, paternity,
and adoption statutes to the surrogate situation. However,
this conflicts with many of the statutes governing artificial
insemination by donor (AID).
Certain authorities hold that a contract to terminate the
parental rights to a child is not one that can be entered into
with informed consent.96 A psychologist who works with
mothers who give up children for adoption has said: "We
cannot permit surrogate mothers to be used as machines to
produce babies and then toss them out afterwards .... These
women are incapable of understanding the impact that surren-
dering a child will have upon them until they have a living,
93. A. v. C., 8 Fam. 170 (1978).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 171.
96. Hanley, Expert Questions the Consent Granted by Mother of Baby M, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 7, 1987, at 29, col. 1. According to psychiatrist Dr. John J. Vetter "[a]
woman cannot possibly know how she is going to feel until the baby is born." Id. A
woman cannot "fully understand or anticipate all the implications and ramifications of
the agreement." Id. Psychologists Phyliss Silverman adds that "[t]hese women are in-
capable of understanding the impact that surrendering a child will have upon them until
they have a living breathing baby." Hornblower, Fight Over Baby M Shows That Money
Counts, Milw. J., Feb. 20, 1987, at 8A, col. 1.
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breathing baby."97 In addition, in many situations one lawyer
represents all parties. Thus, ethical problems are apparent.98
According to Law Professor Nadine Taub,99 gender and
class are at the base of this problem of surrogacy, the wealthy
couples who purchase the babies versus the women who are
financially burdened enough to go through with the sale.' °°
Attorneys for the State of Michigan in Doe v. Kelley 10 argue
that if paying a fee to a surrogate is allowed the court becomes
a price-setter, "perhaps allowing higher compensation for a
bright, beautiful surrogate as opposed to a less attractive, less
intelligent one."' 02 There is a real danger that a premium will
develop for one type over another.
The attorneys conclude their argument saying, "the integ-
rity of the court system and the statutory adoption process
demands that the court be absolutely prohibited from deciding
which individual has a Saks Fifth Avenue price tag and which
individual has a K-Mart price tag."'0 3 Attorney General
Frank J. Kelley"° challenges the reference to the surrogate
mother, appropriately noting that the surrogate is the natural
mother and the adoptive mother (wife of the biological fa-
ther) is actually the "substitute (or surrogate) mother if she
were permitted to adopt the child."'0 5
In an attempt to circumvent the statutes which forbid the
payment of money in exchange for a child, most contracts are
written as contracts to "bear a child."'0 6 It is felt that this
phraseology will be less offensive. In Kentucky, one judge
states that the language used in a surrogate mother contract
avoids the use of the term adoption 10 7 and "[tihe purpose of
97. Hornblower, supra note 96, at 8A.
98. Id. An ethical issue is raised when one attorney represents both sides in this
situation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rules 1.7 - 1.9 (1983); see
also Handel, supra note 8.
99. Hornblower, supra note 96, at 8A.
100. Id.
101. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
102. L. ANDREWS, supra note 62, at 230 (quoting from the Michigan State Attor-
neys' arguments).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 230.
105. Id. at 231.
106. Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 613 (1978).
107. Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 215 (Ky.
1986) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
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the language of the contract is merely to avoid KRS
199.590(2). It is merely a subterfuge."'" 8
In Doe v. Kelley, 10 9 the issue is whether the Michigan stat-
utes can prohibit the payment of a fee to the surrogate
mother. The Michigan Court of Appeals responds by saying:
The statute in question does not directly prohibit John
Doe and Mary Roe from having the child as planned [by
means of a surrogate mother]. It acts instead to preclude
plaintiffs from paying consideration in conjunction with
their use of the state's adoption procedures. In effect, the
plaintiffs' contractual agreement discloses a desire to use the
adoption code to change the legal status of the child.... We
do not perceive this goal as within the realm of fundamental
interests protected by the right to privacy from reasonable
governmental regulation."'
Several jurisdictions also hold that the paternity statutes
or termination of parental rights statutes of their respective
states cannot be used to validate a surrogate arrangement. In
Syrkowski v. Appleyard,11' the circuit court states that:
This Court, today, decides that the Paternity Act was
not intended, and cannot be used, as a mechanism to estab-
lish the paternal rights of a semen donor in a "surrogate
parent arrangement." Neither the laws nor public policy of
the State of Michigan permit the direct or indirect judicial
recognition and enforcement of "surrogate mother" con-
tracts. The social wisdom and legal recognition of such
agreements are matters of legislative concern and not for
judicial pre-emption." 2
In March of 1983, the circuit court for Jefferson County,
Kentucky, relying on the legal presumption that a child born
to a married woman was the child of her spouse, refused to
accept a mere affidavit of AID and added that "[t]he Termina-
tion Act is not a paternity act and it contains no provision
108. Id. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Baldwin 1986) as amended in 1984
reads: "No person, agency, institution or intermediary may sell or purchase or procure
for sale or purchase any child for the purpose of adoption or any other purpose, includ-
ing termination of parental rights." Id.
109. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
110. Id. at -, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
111. [May-June] Human Reproduction & L. Rep. (Legal-Medical Studies) 15 (Cir.
Ct. Michigan 1981). Syrkowski v. Appleyard was remanded 420 Mich. 367, 362
N.W.2d 211, 1985 (the trial court has jurisdiction to decide biological paternity).
112. Id.
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under which a court may adjudge paternity of a child... ."' ' I
Maryland, also relying on the presumption that a child's fa-
ther is his mother's mate required more than just testimony of
an artificial insemination procedure. 1 4 Petitioner, asking to
adopt her husband's child, requested that the court forego
normal investigative procedures of a custody case. The natu-
ral mother's whereabouts were unknown and apparently the
natural mother was married and living with her husband at
the time of the child's birth. In this instance the surrogate
arrangement had been arranged by Miracle Program"15 at a
total cost of $25,000 - $10,000 of which was paid to the sur-
rogate mother. The court required further investigation." 6
In Kentucky, the Attorney General brought suit against
Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., 7 (SPA) in an attempt
to revoke its charter for baby-selling, claiming that three Ken-
tucky statutes were being violated. These statutes deal with
"sale, purchase or procurement for sale or purchase of any
child for the purpose of adoption,"118 prohibition against fil-
ing for termination of parental rights prior to five days after
birth of a child, 19 and that consent for adoption given prior to
five days after birth is invalid. 21 In Surrogate Parenting As-
sociates, Inc. v. Armstrong,'2' the majority mistakenly fails to
find that the legislature has ruled against surrogacy. 122 They
say the contract is not illegal but voidable and refuse to call
the process baby-selling. 12 3 Only the dissenting opinions are
113. In re Baby Girl, 9 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2348 (Jefferson Co., Ky. Cir. Ct. Apr.
5. 1983).
114. hI re R.K.S. [July - Aug.] Human Reproduction & L. Rep. (Legal-Medical
Studies) 200 (Super. Ct. D.C. 1984).
115. Miracle Program is one of the centers that arranges for surrogate procedures.
See supra note 9.
116. In re R.K.S., [July-Aug.] Human Reproduction & L. Rep. 200. If the reader
found it hard to distinguish the parties in this case, imagine the confusion for any chil-
dren involved in the process.
117. Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Armstrong. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
118. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Baldwin 1986).
119. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.601(2) (Baldwin 1986) states: "No petition [for
voluntary termination of parental rights] may be filed [by a parent] under this chapter
prior to five (5) days after the birth of the child.- Id.
120. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) (Baldwin 1986).
121. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
122. Id. at 212.
123. Id. at 213-14.
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credible,124 especially in light of the fact that in 1984 the Ken-
tucky legislature amended KRS section 199.590(2) to prohibit
the "purchase of any child for the purpose of adoption or any
other purpose, including termination of parental rights."'1 25
The majority attempts to show that since the baby is going to
a natural parent this statute does not hold: 126 "[T]here are
fundamental differences between the surrogate parenting pro-
cedure ... and the buying and selling of children as prohibited
by [the statute] which place this surrogate parenting proce-
dure beyond the purview of present legislation."' 127 The court
claims that what is different is the time of entrance into the
agreement. The fact that the woman is not trying to avoid
conception, but entering into the agreement prior to the preg-
nancy, is paramount to the court. 128 Here the court falls prey
to the false analogy of sperm donation being the counterpart
of surrogacy.129
Both of the dissenting opinions are more attuned to the
actual situation. Justice Vance, in his dissent, states:
[T]he fact remains that [SPA's] primary purpose is to locate
women who will readily, for a price, allow themselves to be
used as human incubators and who are willing to sell, for a
price, all of their parental rights in a child thus born ....
It is stipulated that Surrogate Parenting Associates is an
intermediary which offers to assist infertile couples in ob-
taining a child .... I view the subsequent delivery of the
child together with an agreed judgment terminating the pa-
rental rights of the natural mother in exchange for a mone-
tary consideration to be no less than the sale of a child.' 3°
Justice Wintersheimer, in an even stronger argument, dissents
and says:
[T]he people of the Commonwealth of Kentucky have not
abdicated their sovereignty to a self-appointed group of
scientists-kings. The tolerance of the many can easily lead to
the tyranny of a few. The attractiveness of assistance to
124. The dissenting Justices are Justice Vance and Justice Wintersheimer. Id. at
214.
125. Id. at 211 n.2 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 211.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 211-12.
129. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text.
130. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d at 214 (Vance, J., dissenting).
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childless couples should not be a cosmetic facade for unnec-
essary tampering with human procreation.
Animals are reproduced; human beings are procreated
[T]he consequences which could arise from the opening
of the human uterus to commercial medical technology does
not contribute to the emancipation of women .... [T]he
safeguarding of marriage and the family is essential to the
continuation of human society as we know it. The possibil-
ity of exploitation of women as surrogate mothers is totally
undesirable ....
Our consideration of public policy in this regard should
include the possible exploitation of financially-needy women
.... The price at which a woman will sell her reproductive
capacity may depend on her financial status.'
The New York Surrogate Court in Matter of Adoption of
Baby Girl L.J. ,132 analyzed both Doe v. Kelley 133 and Surro-
gate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Armstrong. 34 They rejected
the Michigan court's analysis preferring to adopt the majority
position in Armstrong. The New York court states:
However, this court, in spite of its strong reservations
about these arrangements both on moral and ethical
grounds, is inclined to follow the majority opinion by find-
ing that biomedical science has advanced man into a new
era of genetics which was not contemplated by either the
Kentucky legislature nor by the New York legislature
135
However the court does expand upon the Kentucky decision,
and reserves for itself the right to refuse to place the child
with the natural father. 36
It must be noted that in the above cases the courts do not
deal with the problem of a mother breaching her contract and
refusing to surrender the child. That question is currently
before the New Jersey court. 137
131. Id. at 214-16 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
132. 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
133. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
134. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
135. In re Baby Girl, 132 Misc. 2d at -, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817-18.
136. Id. at -, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
137. While this Comment is being written the media abounds with daily reports of
the first United States case in which a surrogate mother has decided she wants her baby
back and the natural father has gone to court to sue for enforcement of the contract.
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In all of the above cases, only the dissent in Armstrong 138
addresses what has the potential to become an important "wo-
man's" issue. Will the courts' recognition of the validity of
the surrogate contract create a class of "breeders?" Will all
the advances for which women have worked now be lost due
to a subset of women who spend their most productive years
as breeders in the same way one might breed a race horse?
Such questions will arise [to] the legal status of breeding as a
profession, or the appropriate pecuniary value of boy babies
over girls or light-skinned children over dark-skinned ones.
Finally, the courts and legislatures will have to deal with the
ultimate question of what dollar value can or cannot be
placed on a human life.'39
Perhaps the most important issue concerning the contract
has not yet been addressed. A baby is not a saleable commod-
ity. One cannot contract to sell another human being as this
was outlawed by the thirteenth amendment.' 4° "Whether
payment was made before the woman is inseminated or after
Mary Beth Whitehead agreed to be a surrogate for William and Elizabeth Stem. After
the birth of a daughter (called Sarah by Mrs. Whitehead and Melissa by the Stems),
Mrs. Whitehead found that she could not part with the child. The Stems have filed suit.
In a bifurcated trial, the first phase dealt with the validity of the contract. Questions
arose as to whether a surrogate is capable of giving informed consent (see supra note 97
and accompanying text), and whether the Sterns fraudulently represented themselves as
an infertile couple. Dr. Elizabeth Stem claims to have a mild case of multiple sclerosis,
which made her fear pregnancy. Peterson, Doctors Split on Pregnancy's Risks to Women
with Multiple Sclerosis, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1987, at 11, col. 4. The majority of neurol-
ogists hold that pregnancy is not barred by mild cases of multiple sclerosis. 'MS No Bar
to Pregnancy' MED. WORLD NEWS, Feb. 12, 1987, at 11, col. 1. The second phase of
the trial is the custody hearing. See, e.g., Hanley, Baby M's Mother Seen as Caught in
Dilemma, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1987, at 16, col. 1; Who Keeps 'Baby M'?, supra note 51.
On March 31, 1987, Judge Harvey Sorkon of the Bergen County Family Court termi-
nated Marybeth Whitehead's parental rights to Sarah. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super.
313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Super. Ct. 1987). Mrs. Whitehead is currently appealing the deci-
sion to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
138. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d at 214-16 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
139. R. DAVIES, WOMEN & THE LAW § 8.02[3] (Lefcourt ed. 1986).
140. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. See Holder,
Surrogate Motherhood: Babies for Fun & Profit, LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE, re-
printed in 90 CASE & COMMENT 3 (Mar.-Apr. 1985). "Children cannot be bought and
sold. None of these surrogate mother decisions ...have mentioned the thirteenth
amendment ... but its prohibition of slavery, sale of one person by another, seems
relevant." Id. at 9. See also This Week with David Brinkley, (ABC television broad-
cast, Jan. 11, 1987) (transcript no. 272 at 12-14).
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the baby is born seems irrelevant; the intention of the arrange-
ment is to fulfill a contract for the payment of money in ex-
change for a human being."'' 4 1
The sale of a person is against public policy.' 42 Further-
more, courts have held that "an agreement by a parent to re-
linquish custody of his child is against public policy.' ' 43 This
is also supported by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
which states that promises regarding the custody of a child are
unenforceable. 1" Even if there is no money involved the court
is not bound to honor the placement wishes of the natural par-
ent. In Barwin v. Reidy,145 the court states that: "[A]lthough
the natural parents may specify the person they wish to adopt
their child, the court is not bound to so decree."'' 46
By trying to differentiate between baby-selling and con-
tracts to bear a child, courts such as New York and Kentucky
have argued that the difference is that the contract is sealed
prior to conception and that the woman wanted to conceive.
What they do not understand is that when one contracts to
"bear a baby" one is making a contract to sell a child. The
money exchanged is consideration and there is now a contract
to sell a human being.'47 In an adoption situation where a
couple agrees to pay medical expenses, the agreement to adopt
141. Holder, supra note 140, at 9, reprinted in 90 CASE & COMMENT 3 (Mar.- Apr.
1985).
142. This Week with David Brinkley, supra note 140, at 12-14; See also Handel,
supra note 8, at 784 (there are felony statutes that prohibit payment in exchange for
custody of another human being).
143. Fox v. Lasley, 212 Or. 80, -, 318 P.2d 933, 940 (1957) (en banc). See also
Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, -, 185 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1971) (contract giving cus-
tody of a child to another in exchange for value is void).
144. "A promise affecting the right of custody of a minor child is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy .. " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 (1979);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS § 178 (1979) (when a term is unenforceable
on grounds of public policy); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179(b)(ii)
(1979) (basis of public policies against enforcement of a contract which causes impair-
ment of family relations).
145. 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957).
146. Id. at -, 307 P.2d at 180.
147. See Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky.
1986) (Vance, J., dissenting).
[A] portion of the payment is withheld and is not paid until [the surrogate's]
living child is delivered unto the purchaser, along with the equivalent of a bill of
sale, or quit-claim deed, to wit - the judgment terminating her parental
rights.... I view the ... exchange ... to be no less than the sale of a child.
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is entered into after the pregnancy has already begun. Now
any money given is paid to insure the health of the baby and
not for services rendered. 48 The argument that the surrogate
contract also is for services rendered fails because final pay-
ment is not made until the mother terminates her parental
rights and hands over the baby. Again it is the transaction of
giving the child which makes this baby-selling. The child
equals the goods received.
V. WISCONSIN
Adoption was unknown at common law. 4 9 Today adop-
tion is created and regulated by statutes in all fifty states. 150
Most states allow for the payment of the expectant mother's
medical expenses. 5 ' Some states will also allow the payment
of reasonable expenses for rent, food, and clothing.152
Twenty-four states prohibit payment in connection with
adoption. 153 Wisconsin is among the states that disallow pay-
ment for other than medical expenses. 54
Twenty-four states have statutes that dictate that if a mar-
ried woman is artificially inseminated with her husband's con-
sent, then the child is the legal offspring of her husband. 55 In
148. To ensure that there is no question as to the purpose of the money, it can be
paid directly to the hospital and/or physician.
149. See Holder, supra note 140, at 3, reprinted in 90 CASE & COMMENT 3 (Mar.-
Apr. 1985).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 3-4.
153. Andrews, The Stork Market, supra note 81, at 54-55.
154. Wis. STAT. § 946.716(1)(a) (1985-86). This statute makes it a class E felony
($10,000 fine and/or two years imprisonment) for anyone who "[p]laces or agrees to
place his or her child for adoption for anything exceeding the actual cost of the hospital
and medical expenses of the mother and the child incurred in connection with the
child's birth, and of the legal and other services rendered in connection with the adop-
tion." Id.
155. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c)
(1982); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-69f, 45-69n (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West 1986);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128, 23-129 (1981); LA.
CiV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1987); MD. EST. & TRUST CODE ANN. § 1-
206(b) (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2824(6), 700.111 (West Supp. 1987);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.061 (Michie 1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney
1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 551-553 (West
1987); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.239, .243, .247 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-
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Wisconsin the legislature has gone a step further and under
Wisconsin Statute section 891.40 (2), the donor of sperm to a
woman other than his wife is not the father of any subsequent
pregnancy.1 56 Section 767.47(a) also takes the position that
"[w]here a child is conceived by artificial insemination, the
husband of the mother of the child at the time of conception
... is the natural father of the child, as provided in [section]
891.40."' 157 Wisconsin Statute section 767.47(2m) prohibits
the information regarding the artificial insemination from be-
ing used in a paternity action.1 58
Thus, it is evident that the sperm donor has no legal right
to the child. A surrogate mother, in Wisconsin, could termi-
nate her parental rights as agreed, but the court would be
under no obligation to place the child with the sperm donor.
The sperm donor would also be excluded from adopting the
child under Wisconsin Statute section 48.835,159 which allows
a parent to place a child with a relative without going through
the court. 60 However, the parties could arrange for a private
adoption, which prohibits the payment of a fee, insures a
proper investigation by the court of the adopting couple, and
protects the innocent third party - i.e. the child.
Wisconsin should not change its present legislation con-
cerning artificial insemination. As the statutes now stand, the
state is protected from the rise of commercialism in surrogacy
as has been evidenced in other states.161
306 (Supp. 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-7.1 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (1986); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103
(1977).
156. WIS. STAT. § 891.40(2) (1985-86). "The donor of semen ... for use in artifi-
cial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is not the natural father of a
child conceived, bears no liability for the support of the child and has no parental rights
with regard to the child." Id. (emphasis added).
157. WIs. STAT. § 767.47(9) (1985-86).
158. WIS. STAT. § 767.47(2m) (1985-86) (medical and genetic information of the
insemination is not admissible to prove paternity).
159. WIS. STAT. § 48.835(2) (1985-86) (allows a parent to place a child for adop-
tion in the home of a relative without a court order).
160. Under Wis. STAT. § 891.40(2) (1985-86) the sperm donor is not the natural
father and therefore, by law, is not a relative of the baby.
161. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Legislatures are being asked to consider bills that would
allow surrogacy and the payment of a fee. The form of legis-
lation most often proposed allows that the surrogate will pro-
vide a baby for a married couple in which the wife is infertile.
Such legislation may be in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. This service cannot be limited to married infertile
couples. In Wisconsin, by statute, anyone (single or married)
may adopt. 162 There is no marital requirement in the artificial
insemination statutes. 163 Noel Keane 164 has already worked
with single men, one of whom never wanted to see the baby,
but insisted that a gamete splitting process be employed be-
cause he wanted to have a male offspring.' 65 He merely sends
support money to the child. In another instance he arranged a
surrogate procedure for a couple in which the wife was a
transsexual.' 66 He has also arranged a surrogate situation for
a single female professional who couldn't allow a pregnancy to
get in the way of tenure. 167 If the legislature is to give official
sanction to the use of surrogate mothers they will be opening a
Pandora's box of legal, ethical, and moral entanglements.
Several commentators cite the Bible as documenting the
practice of surrogacy (not via AID) in an attempt to legitimize
their position.' 68 They quote Genesis and the story of Ish-
mael.' 69 However this is not a case of surrogacy. Hagar was a
legal concubine of Abram, as was the custom of the people at
that time.'7 0 Never was Hagar asked to relinquish her paren-
162. Wis. STAT. § 48.82(1)(b) (1985-86) (an unmarried adult may adopt).
163. But see Smith & Iraola, supra note 21.
164. Mr. Keane is one of the first advocates of surrogate motherhood and today his
practice is devoted totally to surrogate arrangements. Pierce, supra note 81, at 3002.
165. N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 4, at 241.
166. Id. at 150. The baby was kept by the natural mother because the father was
upset by the publicity surrounding the case. The father settled for his name on the birth
certificate, but was denied visitation rights. L. ANDREWS, supra note 62 at 212-13.
167. Id. at 212.
168. See, e.g., Note, Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal As-
pects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 467 (1982); Note, In Defense of Surro-
gate Parenting: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Kentucky Experience, 69 KS'. L.J. 877.
880 (1980-81); Brochure, supra note 4.
169. Genesis 16:1 - 25:12 (According to the Masoretic text).
170. Abram and Sarah were from Babylon, where it was the legalized custom for
the husband of a barren wife to take a concubine in order to have offspring. THE PEN-
TATEUCH & HAFrORAHS 56 n.2 (J. Hertz 2d ed. 1961).
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tal role. If this story is to be used for any purpose, then it
must also be noted that Sarah was jealous of Hagar, 7 ' finally
causing Hagar and her son to be expelled from the camp.' 2
After leaving his father's camp, Ishmael matures and becomes
the father of a nation 173 that has been at war with his father's
people from that day until the present. 174 This story does not
speak well of surrogate parenting.
When the desire to be a parent combines with the hus-
band's insistance that parenthood only be achieved by hav-
ing a biologically related offspring, we are perpetuating the
myth that family is defined in terms of the man's genes. In a
male- dominated society, the result may be that "[a] voice of
law which is a predominantly male voice, articulating
predominantly male concerns and values will produce a male
model of the moral economy of women. Maternity and moth-
erhood will be made and re-made male."'17 5
The argument that there are not enough babies available
should not cause the statutes to be changed. To allow surro-
gacy and especially surrogacy for a fee fosters the idea that
anything can be purchased if one has money. We are degrad-
ing life when children are merely chattel, sold to the highest
bidder.
NANCY W. MACHINTON*
171. Genesis, supra note 169, at 21:10-14.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 25:12-18.
174. THE PENTATEUCH & HAFTORAHS, supra note 170, at 56 n.6.
175. Morgan, Making Motherhood Male: Surrogacy & the Moral Economy of Wo-
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* The author wishes to thank Stephen Machinton, M.D., for his guidance on the
medical aspects of this comment.
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